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Chapter I:

Three Opposing Interpretations

In October of 1962 the world watched as the United States
and the Soviet Union went to the brink of nuclear war in a
confrontation over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba.

Over the

past quarter of a century, observers have taken an increasingly
critical look at the Cuban missile crisis, resulting in the
development of a scholarly controversy over the confrontation.
Although the debate regarding the crisis is varied and expansive,
most critiques can be placed into one of three categories of
interpretation:

the traditional perspective, the right-wing

perspective, and the left-wing perspective.
The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis
is held by nearly all of the participants in the crisis, as
well as by many contemporary observers, including numerous
journalists and political scientists of the 1960s and 1970s.
For the most part, the traditionalists form a cohesive inter
pretation, with nearly all traditional writers agreeing on at
least three basic issues.

First, there is a consensus among

traditionalists in the belief that intelligence experts in
both the United States and the Soviet Union were guilty of
serious miscalculations.

The United States was operating under

the mistaken conviction that Soviet foreign policy was too
cautious to permit the emplacement of ballistic missiles in
a country as close to the United States as Cuba.

For the

Soviets, the error was in underestimating the determined U.S.
response to such an act.

Second, traditionalists agree that

President John Kennedy was forced to respond out of necessity

~

to the situation, because the missiles in Cuba represented a
threat, either in actuality or in appearance, to the existing
balance of power, though there is disagreement over whether
this threat was a political or strategic one.

The decision

to implement a blockade on Cuba is hailed because it exerted
maximum pressure on the Soviet Union while incurring the minimum
risk of war.

1

Finally, the traditionalists are in agreement

in their praise of President Kennedy as a calm, rational and
responsible leader.

2

While the traditional interpretation is the most widely
held perspective on the Cuban missile crisis, there is also
strong support for the revisionist interpretations by both the

t

right and left-wings.

The right-wing perspective of the missile

crisis was developed by conservative pOlitical scientists and
Cuban exiles writing almost exclusively in the decade following
the crisis.

Although the right-wing perspective is not as

unified as that of the traditionalists, there are several
points of consensus.

The conservatives are unanimous in their

criticism of President Kennedy's pre-crisis pOlicies regarding
Cuba, claiming that Kennedy's lack of resolve in dealing with
Soviet involvement in Cuba convinced Khrushchev that he could
successfully place missiles on the island.

Once the crisis

began, the general consensus among conservatives is that
Kennedy followed a weak policy of accomodation, allowing the
high improbability of nuclear war dictate a course of action
which resulted in a crushing defeat for the United States.

-3

The missile crisis was a golden opportunity to remove Castro
and liberate Cuba from communism; instead, Kennedy's no-invasion
pledge at the resolution of the crisis gave Khrushchev exactly
what he wanted--a communist base in the Western Hemisphere.

3

The revisionist left-wing interpretation was formulated
primarily in the 1970s by liberal journalists, historians and
political scientists.

The liberal writers have developed a

most cohesive perspective, agreeing on all major issues.

To

the liberals, Kennedy was neither a responsible leader nor a
weak commander; instead, he was a man who, feeling the need
to prove his strength to the world, intentionally raised the
Cuban episode to the level of crisis and confrontation, thus
unnecessarily and recklessly subjecting the world to the

~

threat of nuclear war.

According to the liberals, Soviet

missiles in Cuba represented a change not in the strategic
but in the political balance of power, thereby placing the
appearance and prestige rather than the security and nuclear
superiority of the United States at risk.

Concluding that

the missiles in Cuba were a pOlitical problem requiring a
political sOlution, the left-wing criticizes Kennedy's rejection
of diplomacy and his choice of a military response, in the
form of a naval blockade, which resulted in a confrontation
between the two superpowers.

The aftermath of the crisis for

the liberals is considered a victory of arrogance, with Kennedy
having forced Khruschev to backdown, humiliating him before
the world.

-

4

Thus, participants,

journalists, historians and political

-4

t

scientists have interpreted a single event, the Cuban missile
crisis, from virtually every position on the pOlitical spectrum.
It is from a detailed study of these interpretations that a
clearer understanding of the triumphs and failures of the
Cuban missile crisis can best be reached.

Chapter II:

The Traditional Interpretation

The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis
~s

considered to be the most widely-held perspective on the

confrontation.

It is shared by nearly all of the participants

in the crisis, as well as by contemporary observers; that is,
journalists of the mid-1960s and political scientists of the
1960s and 1970s.

Traditionalists concur in the belief that

intelligence experts in both the United States and the Soviet
Union grossly miscalculated each others actions.

Within this

interpretation there is also general agreement that the United
States action in the form of a naval blockade, coupled with
our conventional military strength in the Caribbean and overall

t

nuclear superiority, was superb in that it was a flexible
response which exerted pressure on the Soviets yet also allowed
Khrushchev time to reconsider his policy.

There is also agree

ment with the assumption that it was the threat posed by
U.S. military

stre~thwhich

was the dominant factor in the

Soviet decision to remove the missiles, although some tradition
alists also stress the importance of diplomatic communication.
Though both traditional participants and observers agree that
President Kennedy responded magnificently to the crisis, they
differ in their areas of emphasis, with the participants
stressing the admirable personal qualities of the President
and observers praising his ability to manage the crisis.

1

In attempting to evaluate Kennedy's decision to initially

t!

respond to the missile crisis with a naval blockade, it is
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Chapter I:

Three Opposing Interpretations

In October of 1962 the world watched as the United States
and the Soviet Union went to the brink of nuclear war in a
confrontation over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba.

Over the

past quarter of a century, observers have taken an increasingly
critical look at the Cuban missile crisis, resulting in the
development of a scholarly controversy over the confrontation.
Although the debate regarding the crisis is varied and expansive,
most critiques can be placed into one of three categories of
interpretation:

the traditional perspective, the right-wing

perspective, and the left-wing perspective.
The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile cr1S1S
1S held by nearly all of the participants in the crisis, as
well as by many contemporary observers, including numerous
journalists and pOlitical scientists of the 1960s and 1970s.
For the most part, the traditionalists form a cohesive inter
pretation, with nearly all traditional writers agreeing on at
least three basic issues.

First, there is a consensus among

traditionalists in the belief that intelligence experts in
both the United States and the Soviet Union were guilty of
serious miscalculations.

The United States was operating under

the mistaken conviction that Soviet foreign policy was too
cautious to permit the emplacement of ballistic missiles in
a country as close to the United States as Cuba.

For the

Soviets, the error was in underestimating the determined U.S.
response to such an act.

Second, traditionalists agree that

-2

t

President John Kennedy was forced to respond out of necessity
to the situation, because the missiles in Cuba represented a
threat, either in actuality or in appearance, to the existing
balance of power, though there is disagreement over whether
this threat was a pOlitical or strategic one.

The decision

to implement a blockade on Cuba is hailed because it exerted
maximum pressure on the Soviet Union while incurring the minimum
riSk of war.

1

Finally, the traditionalists are in agreement

in their praise of President Kennedy as a calm, rational and
responsible leader.

2

While the traditional interpretation is the most widely
held perspective on the Cuban missile crisis, there is also
strong support for the revisionist interpretations by both the

~:

right and left-wings.

The right-wing perspective of the missile

crisis was developed by conservative political scientists and
Cuban exiles writing almost exclusively in the decade following
the crisis.

Although the right-wing perspective is not as

unified as that of the traditionalists, there are several
points of consensus.

The conservatives are unanimous in their

criticism of President Kennedy's pre-crisis pOlicies regarding
Cuba, claiming that Kennedy's lack of resolve in dealing with
Soviet involvement in Cuba convinced Khrushchev that he could
successfully place missiles on the island.

Once the crisis

began, the general consensus among conservatives is that
Kennedy followed a weak policy of accomodation, allowing the
high improbability of nuclear war dictate a course of action
which resulted in a crushing defeat for the United States.

The missile crisis was a golden opportunity to remove Castro

-

and liberate Cuba from communism; instead, Kennedy's no-invasion
pledge at the resolution of the crisis gave Khrushchev exactly
what he wanted--a communist base in the Western Hemisphere.

3

The revisionist left-wing interpretation was formulated
primarily in the 1970s by liberal journalists, historians and
political scientists.

The liberal writers have developed a

most cohesive perspective, agreeing on all major issues.

To

the liberals, Kennedy was neither a responsible leader nor a
weak commander; instead, he was a man who, feeling the need
to prove his strength to the world, intentionally raised the
Cuban episode to the level of crisis and confrontation, thus
unnecessarily and recklessly subjecting the world to the
threat of nuclear war.

According to the liberals, Soviet

missiles in Cuba represented a change not in the strategic
but in the pOlitical balance of power, thereby placing the
appearance and prestige rather than the security and nuclear
superiority of the United States at risk.

Concluding that

the missiles in Cuba were a pOlitical problem requiring a
political solution, the left-wing criticizes Kennedy's rejection
of diplomacy and his choice of a military response, in the
form of a naval blockade, which resulted in a confrontation
between the two superpowers.

The aftermath of the crisis for

the liberals is considered a victory of arrogance, with Kennedy
having forced Khruschev to backdown, humiliating him before
the world.

4

Thus, participants,

journalists, historians and pOlitical

-4

t

scientists have interpreted a single event, the Cuban missile
crisis, from virtually every position on the pOlitical spectrum.
It is from a detailed study of these interpretations that a
clearer understanding of the triumphs and failures of the
Cuban missile crisis can best be reached.

t

Chapter II:

The Traditional Interpretation

The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis
is considered to be the most widely-held perspective on the
confrontation.

It is shared by nearly all of the participants

in the crisis, as well as by contemporary observers; that is,
journalists of the mid-1960s and political scientists of the
1960s and 1970s.

Traditionalists concur in the belief that

intelligence experts in both the United States and the Soviet
Union grossly miscalculated each others actions.

Within this

interpretation there is also general agreement that the United
States action in the form of a naval blockade, coupled with
our conventional military strength in the Caribbean and overall

,t

nuclear superiority, was superb in that it was a flexible
response which exerted pressure on the Soviets yet also allowed
Khrushchev time to reconsider his policy.

There is also agree

ment with the assumption that it was the threat posed by
U.S. military

stre~thwhich

was the dominant factor in the

Soviet decision to remove the missiles, although some tradition
alists also stress the importance of diplomatic communication.
Though both traditional participants and observers agree that
President Kennedy responded magnificently to the crisis, they
differ in their areas of emphasis, with the participants
stressing the admirable personal qualities of the President
and observers praising his ability to manage the crisis.

1

In attempting to evaluate Kennedy's decision to initially
respond to the missile crisis with a naval blockade, it is
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Chapter I:

Three Opposing Interpretations

In October of 1962 the world watched as the United States
and the Soviet Union went to the brink of nuclear war in a
confrontation over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba.

Over the

past quarter of a century, observers have taken an increasingly
critical look at the Cuban missile crisis, resulting in the
development of a scholarly controversy over the confrontation.
Although the debate regarding the crisis is varied and expansive,
most critiques can be placed into one of three categories of
interpretation:

the traditional perspective, the right-wing

perspective, and the left-wing perspective.
The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis
lS

held by nearly all of the participants in the crisis, as

well as by many contemporary observers, including numerous
journalists and pOlitical scientists of the 1960s and 1970s.
For the most part, the traditionalists form a cohesive inter
pretation, with nearly all traditional writers agreeing on at
least three basic issues.

First, there is a consensus among

traditionalists in the belief that intelligence experts In
both the United States and the Soviet Union were guilty of
serious miscalculations.

The United States was operating under

the mistaken conviction that soviet foreign policy was too
cautious to permit the emplacement of ballistic missiles in
a country as close to the United States as Cuba.

For the

Soviets, the error was in underestimating the determined U.S.
response to such an act.

Second, traditionalists agree that

-2

President John Kennedy was forced to respond out of necessity
to the situation, because the missiles in Cuba represented a
threat, either in actuality or in appearance, to the existing
balance of power, though there is disagreement over whether
this threat was a political or strategic one.

The decision

to implement a blockade on Cuba is hailed because it exerted
maximum pressure on the Soviet Union while incurring the minimum
risk of war.

l

Finally, the traditionalists are in agreement

in their praise of President Kennedy as a calm, rational and
responsible leader.

2

While the traditional interpretation is the most widely
held perspective on the Cuban missile crisis, there is also
strong support for the revisionist interpretations by both the

-

right and left-wings.

The right-wing perspective of the missile

crisis was developed by conservative political scientists and
Cuban exiles writing almost exclusively in the decade following
the crisis.

Although the right-wing perspective is not as

unified as that of the traditionalists, there are several
points of consensus.

The conservatives are unanimous in their

criticism of President Kennedy's pre-crisis pOlicies regarding
Cuba, claiming that Kennedy's lack of resolve in dealing with
Soviet involvement in Cuba convinced Khrushchev that he could
successfully place missiles on the island.

Once the crisis

began, the general consensus among conservatives is that
Kennedy followed a weak policy of accomodation, allowing the
high improbability of nuclear war dictate a course of action
which resulted in a crushing defeat for the United States.

-3

The missile crisis was a golden opportunity to remove Castro
and liberate Cuba from communism; instead, Kennedy's no-invasion
pledge at the resolution of the crisis gave Khrushchev exactly
what he wanted--a communist base in the Western Hemisphere.

3

The revisionist left-wing interpretation was formulated
primarily in the 1970s by liberal journalists, historians and
political scientists.

The liberal writers have developed a

most cohesive perspective, agreeing on all major issues.

To

the liberals, Kennedy was neither a responsible leader nor a
weak commander; instead, he was a man who, feeling the need
to prove his strength to the world, intentionally raised the
Cuban episode to the level of crisis and confrontation, thus
unnecessarily and recklessly subjecting the world to the
threat of nuclear war.

According to the liberals, Soviet

missiles in Cuba represented a change not in the strategic
but in the political balance of power, thereby placing the
appearance and prestige rather than the security and nuclear
superiority of the United States at risk.

Concluding that

the missiles in Cuba were a POlitical problem requiring a
political solution, the left-wing criticizes Kennedy's rejection
of diplomacy and his choice of a military response, in the
form of a naval blockade, which resulted in a confrontation
between the two superpowers.

The aftermath of the crisis for

the liberals is considered a victory of arrogance, with Kennedy
having forced Khruschev to backdown, humiliating him before
the world.

4

Thus, participants,

journalists, historians and political

-4

scientists have interpreted a single event, the Cuban missile
crisis, from virtually every position on the pOlitical spectrum.
It is from a detailed study of these interpretations that a
clearer understanding of the triumphs and failures of the
Cuban missile crisis can best be reached.

t

Chapter II:

The Traditional Interpretation

The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis
is considered to be the most widely-held perspective on the
confrontation.

It is shared by nearly all of the participants

in the crisis, as well as by contemporary observers; that is,
journalists of the mid-1960s and political scientists of the
1960s and 1970s.

Traditionalists concur in the belief that

intelligence experts in both the United States and the Soviet
Union grossly miscalculated each others actions.

Within this

interpretation there is also general agreement that the United
States action in the form of a naval blockade, coupled with
our conventional military strength in the Caribbean and overall
nuclear superiority, was superb in that it was a flexible
response which exerted pressure on the Soviets yet also allowed
Khrushchev time to reconsider his policy.

There is also agree

ment with the assumption that it was the threat posed by
U.S. military

stre~thwhich

was the dominant factor in the

Soviet decision to remove the missiles, although some tradition
alists also stress the importance of diplomatic communication.
Though both traditional participants and observers agree that
President Kennedy responded magnificently to the crisis, they
differ in their areas of emphasis, with the participants
stressing the admirable personal qualities of the President
and observers praising his ability to manage the crisis.

1

In attempting to evaluate Kennedy's decision to initially
respond to the missile crisis with a naval blockade, it is

-6

-

necessary to understand the various options which Kennedy
and his advisers considered and their reasons for settling
on the blockade course.

The story of the Cuban missile crisis

has been exhaustively told; however, the accounts which are
essential to comprehending the decision process which took
place during those thirteen days are best told by the participants
themselves.
President Kennedy viewed Cuba as perhaps his most pressing
foreign policy problem; yet, while he was aware of increased
Soviet military aid to Castro, he did not have enough evidence
to confront the Soviets, as some conservative congressmen
urged him to do.

However, in statements on September 4 and 13,

the President warned that, while at this time there was no
evidence of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground nuclear
mi ssiles in Cuba, "the gravest of issues would arise" if this
situation were to change.

2

While there was some controversy

regarding the definition of offensive as opposed to defensive
missiles, it is apparent that Kennedy was referring to missiles
which could be launched in an attack against the United States.
For their part, the Soviets maintained in a September 11
statement released on the Soviet news agency TASS that the
armaments in Cuba were strictly defensive, as the nuclear
weapons within the Soviet union were so powerful that there
was "no need to search for sites for them beyond the bounda rie s
of the Soviet union.,,3
Aware of the potential for trouble in Cuba, Kennedy had
increased the number of U-2 flights over the iSland.

On

-7

Sunday mornjng, October 14, Air Force Major Rudolph Anderson,
who a week later would be shot down and killed on a similar
mission, flew the U-2 flight which provided the vital evidence.
By Monday afternoon photographic experts had determined that
In the San Cristobal area of western Cuba there existed the
crude beginnings of a base for medium-range ballistic missiles.

4

It was deemed most expedient to allow the President a restful
njght before facing the imminent crisis, so White House Aide
McGeorge Bundy waited until the next morning to inform Kennedy
of the photographs.

While many have characterized Kennedy's

initial reaction as one of surprise, a more accurate description
may be that of startled anger, as conveyed by his exclamation:
"He can't do this to me!,,5

Despite his initial shock, Kennedy

quickly ordered a meeting at 11:45 that morning of what would
eventually become the Executive Committee (ExComm) of the
National Security Council.

The following men were assembled

by the President, having little in common except Kennedy's
desire for their judgment:
Department of State:
Secretary Dean Rusk, Under
Secretary George Ball, Latin American Assistant
Secretary Edwin Martin, Deputy Under Secretary
Alexis Johnson, and Soviet expert Llewellyn
Thompson. (Participating until departing for
his new post as Ambassador to France the following
nj ght was Charles "Chip" Bohlen.)
Department of Defense:
Secretary Robert McNamara,
Deputy Secretary Paul Nitze and General Maxwell
Taylor (newly appointed Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.)
CIA:

On the first day, Deputy Director CArter;
thereafter, (upon his return to Washington),
Director John McCone.

-8

Other: Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Treasury
Secretary Douglas Dillon, Whjte House Aides
McGeorge Bundy and Theodore Sorenson.
(Also
sitting in on the earlier and later meetings
in the White House were the Vice President
and Kenneth O'Donnell. Others--such as
Dean Acheson, Adlai Stevenson and Robert
Lovett--sat in from time to time; and six
days later USIA Deputy Director Donald Wilson,
acting for the ailing Edward R. Murrow, was
officiallyadded.)6
At their first meeting the ExComm members outlined six
possible courses of action, with four of them being eliminated
relatively quickly.
approaches:

The first two options were diplomatic

to do nothing, or to use diplomatic pressure on

the Soviets, either through the United Nations or with a direct
approach to Khrushchev.

There was some support for the use

of diplomacy as an initial response, with the strongest
advocate being Adlai Stevenson, who proposed either presenting
the situation to the United Nations Security Councilor
offering a deal to the Soviets--we would withdraw our missiles
from Turkey and Italy and give up our naval base at Guantanamo
Bay in exchange for the Soviet withdrawal of missiles in cuba.

7

Moreover, before departing for France, Charles Bohlen strongly
urged the President to use diplomacy as an initial response
..

to t h e crlS1S.

8

Indeed, most evidence indicates that there

was some consideration given to the diplomatic proposals in
the ExComm meetings; after all, some reasoned, we expected the
Soviets to live with our missiles in Turkdy, and by downplaying
the situation we could prevent the Soviets from inflating
the importance of the missiles. 9

Additionally, as Robert

McNamara initially pointed out, we already lived in the range

-9

of Soviet missiles:

"A missile is a missile--it makes no

great difference whether you are killed by a missile fired
..
from the Sovlet
Unlon or from Cu b a." 10

.
However, the Presldent

disagreed with this line of reasoning, maintaining that, while
the missiles may not substantially alter the strategic balance
in fact, that balance would have been substantially altered
in appearance, and in matters of national will and world
leadership, such appearances contribute to reality.II

For

Kennedy, these missiles represented a change in the political
strategic balance and a challenge to his previous warnings;
to do nothing would render American committments invalid.
Perhaps the most important factor in the President's
refusal to consider diplomatic options was concern over political
repercussions.

Although many analysts of the Cuban missile

crisis point to apprehension regarding the outcome of the
November election as a factor in the President's decision,
it is quite possible that Kennedy was more concerned with the
possible loss of popular support for himself if the crisis
was not resolved quickly.

The popular outcry over Soviet

missiles ninety miles off of our shores could have been so
great as to cripple Kennedy as President; therefore, he felt
compelled to react quickly and firmly.
Other considerations against the diplomatic approach
included the suspicion that this move by the Soviets could be
merely the first step in a larger plan, the possibility that
the missiles could become operational while a diplomatic debate
ensued, and the unwillingness to allow Khrushchev to seize

-10

the initiative in a situation which Kennedy wanted to control.

12

The only other diplomatic option which was proposed was a
plan to secretly approach Castro in an effort to convince him
that he should remove the missiles himself because Khrushchev
was planning to double-cross him, thereby also creating a split
,
13
between Havana and Moscow.
However, Kennedy thought even
less of this option than the other diplomatic proposals, and
he confided to Bohlen his disappointment in the unimaginative
'
approac h es comlng
from the State Department. 14

The final option which was fairly quickly eliminated
from consideration, at least as an initial response, was an
.,
lnvaSlon
of Cu b a. 15

An invasion was viewed by most participants

as a last-step alternative, mainly because it would involve
the greatest risk for either world war or for retaliation
against United States allies.

There were also several secondary

considerations which persuaded most ExComm members that a more
reserved initial response was appropriate.

Many were worried

about the general frame of mind of the Soviets.

The Russians

had already made one serious miscalculation by installing the
missiles in Cuba, apparently underestimating the U.S. response;
a Cuban invasion could trigger a devastating reaction.

Ambassador

Thompson emphasized this point by warning the group og
Khrushchev's tendency to react impulsively in certain situations.

16

There was also concern regarding the possibility that
Khrushchev was trying to provoke an attack on Cuba in order
to facilitate a move on Berlin, coupled with the general aware
neww of the difficulties in halting escalation once it has begun.

17

-11

While concern about the reactions from our European
allies to whichever course of action was chosen was not a
primary factor, these considerations nevertheless contributed
to the downfall of both the invasion proposal and the diplomatic
options.

On the one hand, if the United States had

invaded~

Cuba, Europe may have felt that we were overreacting to the
situation; they cared little about Cuba and had long accustomed
themselves to living next door to Soviet missiles.

On the

other hand, there was concern among ExComm members that no
response from the United States would trigger fear among the
allies that the United States was weak; if we did not stand
up to threats in our own backyard, what were the chances of
. ,
.
.
?18
our rlslng to a Sovlet challenge In Europe.

Although throughout that week of ExComm meetings Kennedy's
advisers would return to any and all of the proposed options,
the debate eventually came to focus on two proposals.

First,

an air strike against Cuba, either restricted to the missile
strikes (the "surgical strike") or including other military
targets as well, with or without warning.

Second, the implemen

tation of a naval blockade on the island, with a wide range
.
' de d on the b locka d e llSt.
'
19
of ltems
wh'lch could be lnclu

Ensuing debate over these two options was more or less dictated
by what came to be the general goal of most of the President's
advisers:

defining the proper economy of force that would

insure the quick dismantling of the sites with the least
.
'h 00 d of retallatlon.
..
20
llkell

Early in the week, support was strongest for the air strike;
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the goal was to eliminate the missiles, and the idea of a
"surgical ll air strike, quickly and effectively removing the
missiles, was appealing.

Indeed, according to Robert Kennedy,

liThe general feeling in the beginning was that some form of
action was required .... Most felt, at that stage, that an air
strike against the missiles could be the only course.
support for the air strike gradually faded.

21

Yet

There were the

ever-present concerns regarding the reactions of our allies;
the Latin American experts warned that a massive air strike,
potentially killing thousands of Cubans, would permanently
damage the United States in the hemisphere, and the European
experts said Europe would regard a surprise attack as an
.
exceSSlve
response. 22

However, t h ere were two factors wh'lch

were decisive in Kennedy's decision to implement the blockade
instead of the air strike:

first, the argument from morality

and tradition that the United States could not perpetrate
a "Pearl Harbor in reverse," and, second, the realization that
a

II

'
..'
,
,
,
23
surglcal
alr strlke
was lmposslble.

The moral argument against an air strike was presented
passionately by the Attorney General, who pursuasively insisted
that an attack without warning at dawn that Sunday would be
a "Pearl Harbor in reverse, and it would blacken the name of
the United States in the pages of history.

11

24

Some air strike

advocates proposed an air strike with a warning, but Sorenson,
President Kennedy's chief speech writer, could not draft a
suitable statement:

IINo matter how many references I put in

to a summit, to peaceful intentions and to previous warnlngs
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and pledges, the letter still sounded like an ultimatum no
great power coul d accept. II 25

'
.
Yet, accordlng
to Art h ur Sc h leslnger,

Jr., in retrospect most participants regarded Robert Kennedy's
.
,
.
, t h e d eC1Slon
' .
speech as the cruclal
turnlng
pOlnt
ln
process. 26
However, in the President's mind the realization that an
alr strike could not be surgical was perhaps an even greater
factor in his decision than the morality argument.

The military

advisers maintained that an air strike could not be limited
to the missile sites alone; other military areas would have
to be targeted in order to protect American fighters.

Such

an attack would undoubtedly result in the deaths of many
Soviets as well as Cubans, leaving Khrushchev no alternative
,.

but to retallate ln some manner.

27

Just as important for

Kennedy was the fact that, even with a massive air attack,
there was no guarantee that all of the missiles would be
d 28
remove.

'
.
.
d to meet the goal of
Th us, t h
e alr
strlke
falle

removing the missiles from Cuba.
On the other hand, Kennedy's ultimate choice, the naval
blockade or, as he termed it, the quarantine, also did not
meet this goal; indeed, there originally had been very little
support for a blockade.

It appeared to be almost irrelevant

to the problem, as it provided no method of getting the missiles
out of Cuba.

29

Moreover, opponents argued that a blockade

would not exert the pressure required to convince Khrushchev
to remove the missiles and would also permit work to continue
'
.
,
. h . 30
on t h e sltes,
lmplylng
that the result woul d be anot h er MunlC
Some air strike advocates reasonably pointed out that if the
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Soviets chose to ignore the blockade the United States would
be forced to fire, Soviets would be killed, and Khrushchev
would be forced to retaliate.

This was the same argument used

against the air strike, only in this case it would come without
. of t h e removal of the mlSSlles.
.,
3 1Flnally,
.
t h e b eneflt
t h ere
was the contention that the obvious response to a blockade
of Cuba would be a Soviet blockade of Berlin.

32

This fear went

back to the theory that the deployment of missiles in Cuba
was merely a ruse for the Soviets to make a move in Berlin,
and many of Kennedy's advisers warned that a blockade of Cuba
would merely invite Khrushchev to respond in kind in Berlin.
Despite these difficulties, the blockade proposal event
ually drew the support of a majority of the ExComm members and
of the President.

The most attractive aspect of the blockade

for Kennedy was that it was a flexible response, allowing
Khrushchev time to reconsider his actions and leaving the door
, h d'19n1ty.
,
33
open for a retreat Wlt

Also crucial for the President

was the fact that, as an initial step, the blockade served
as an instrument of intensifying pressure, either by adding
such items as "POL" (petroleum, oil and lubricants) to the
initial blockade list of only offensive weapons, or by moving
up the military ladder of escalation to an air strike, or even
.
.
34
an lnvaSlon.

'
'
,
In ot h er wor d s, unllke
th
e alr
strlke,
the

blockade did not eliminate as many options for future action.
There were other less decisive but still important attributes
of the blockade course.

It could be legitimized, to a certain

degree, by the support of the Organization of American States,
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which did in fact unanimously vote in favor of the United States
action the following week.

Finally, a blockade was more likely

to avoid the condemnation of world opinion, which almost certainly
would have resulted from a surprise attack by the United States
on Cuba.

3S

The traditional interpretation of the Cuban missile cr1S1S
1S put forth by both participants in the Kennedy administration
and contemporary observers; however, as a group, the former
members of the Kennedy administration are both the most prolific
writers on the crisis and the staunchest supporters of
President Kennedy.
One of the earliest traditional interpretations by a
Kennedy official was by Theodore Sorenson, whose book Kennedy
was published in 1968.

Sorenson was a White House Aide to

the President, and a key participant in the ExComm meetings.
He is unwavering in his praise for Kennedy's actions during
the crisis, summing up his opinion with a quotation from
Kennedy's Profiles in Courage:

"He may live long, he may do

much.

He never can exceed what he

But this is the summit.

'
d ay." 36
does t h 1S

" analys1s Sorenson emphaslzes
,
In hlS
the

miscalculations made by both the United States and Soviet intell
igence experts.

United States intelligence believed Soviet

foreign policy to be too cautious to risk placing ballistic
missiles in Castro's Cuba, and the Soviets were guilty of
underestimating the United States reaction to such a move.
Moreover, Sorenson maintains that President Kennedy was
compelled to respond to the missiles because they would
"materially ... and politically change the balance of power"
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ln the Cold War.

37

Sorenson strongly advocated a blockade as

the best option for the United States, because it was a limited
military action which permitted a more controlled escalation
on our part, yet was less likely to precipitate war than an
,
,38
alr
strlke.

"
T h us, for Sorenson, K enne d y's d
eCJS10n
struck

the perfect balance between doing too much and not doing enough:
"He had reassured those nations fearing we would use too much
strength and those fearing we would use none at all.

He had,

as Harold Macmillan would later say, earned his place in
'
b y t h'1S one act alone." 39
h lstory

Secretary of State Dean Rusk provided his traditional
interpretation of the crisis twenty years after the event, in
an annlversary article for Time.

Like other traditionalists,

Rusk commends Kennedy and the choice of a limited response in
the form of a blockade.

He also places considerable emphasis

on the role of secret diplomacy in the resolution of the crisis:
"The political and military pressure created by the quarantine
was matched by a diplomatic effort that ignored no relevant
means of communication with both our friends and our adver
saries.,,40

Indeed, Rusk points to the implicit promise of

Robert Kennedy to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin regarding the
removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey as a crucial factor
. t h e termlnatlon
"
, , 41
ln
of the crlS1S.
Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs,
McGeorge Bundy, who wrote an article for Foreign Affairs in
1964, stresses the importance of military factors over diplomatic
ones in the resolution of the crisis, stating that "the armed
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strength of the United States, if handled with firmness and
prudence, lS a great force for peace. 42

Although during the

preliminary ExComm meetings Bundy favored the use of a diplomatic
appeal to resolve the crisis, he eventually came to be an
advocate of an air strike against Cuba.

Despite this, his

praise for President Kennedy is unwavering, placing him in
the traditional camp:

"A further element of strength in this

crisis was the firmness and clarity of the Presidential
decision to insist on the withdrawal of the missiles .... The
strength of this position, like the strength of the available
military force, was reinforced by its disciplined relation
.

.

to a pOllCy of restralnt."

43

.

. .

.

Whlle never stated ln expllclt

terms, Bundy implies that it was the combined conventional
and nuclear strength of the United States coupled with the
President's willingness to risk nuclear war that affected a
.
44
peaceful Solutlon.

However, ln
. an lssue
.
th
at '1S present 1 y

the source of great debate, other traditionalists hold that
Kennedy was not as willing to risk nuclear war as Bundy claims.
with Sorenson insisting that if the quarantine had failed
the President "would not have moved immediately to either an
air strike or an invasion. 1I45

This disagreement over Kennedy's

willingness to risk nuclear war and the role of diplomacy 1n
resolving the crisis is the major point of conflict among
traditionalists.
The recollections of Kennedy's Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, are put forth in his
book Swords and Plowshares, and generally agree with those
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of Bundy.

Taylor was the strongest air strike advocate among

ExComm members, believing that it was essential to remove
the missiles before they became operational.

While he acknow

ledged that not all of the missiles would be destroyed in an
air strike, he felt that "there was reason to hope that this
demonstration of American determination, followed by a blockade
of Cuba and preparation for an invasion of the island, would
bring Khrushchev to his senses and induce him to liquidate
this rash venture. ,,46

Obviously, other ExComm members did

not share Taylor's willingness to base their decision on the
"hope" that such action would induce Khrushchev to remove the
missiles.

Yet Taylor maintains that the reason he supported

the air strike was his belief that a blockade would eventually
necessitate either an invasion of Cuba, an option he felt the
United States could not afford either pOlitically or militarily,
' d own from t h
or backlng
e "
sltuatlon. 47

In accordance with

other traditionalists, Taylor does stress the miscalculations
of intelligence experts, contributing these on the American
side to the profusion of rumors and the confusion over the
'd
'
' , ,
d eflnltlon
of offenslve
an d
efenslve
weapons. 48

Also, t h e

fact that Taylor offers nothing but praise for Kennedy's
handling of the crisis, maintaining that in making his decision
"President Kennedy behaved as any responsible leader is likely
to do in a crisis in the nuclear age," puts him in the trad
, .
.
49
ltlonal
perspectlve.

.
However, Taylor agrees wlth
Bun d y t h at

it was not diplomatic manuevering but "the growing impatience
of the President backed by his formidable invasion force ready
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,
, h resolve d the crISIS.
' ,
50
to strIke"
WhlC

Although not intimately involved in the decision process,
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., as Special Assistant to President
Kennedy and a member of the United States delegation to the
United Nations during the crisis, offers a strong traditional
interpretation of the confrontation.

According to Schlesinger,

the United States intelligence experts grossly miscalculated
Soviet intentions in Cuba, considering Soviet policy too
rational for such a risky venture.

Khrushchev, Schlesinger

reasons, must have considered the risk worthwhile in that it
would destroy the world's trust in United States resolve and
protection. 51

Schlesinger also supports the traditional view

that Kennedy had no alternative than to insist on the removal
of the missiles.

To do nothing would have been "a stunning

vindication of the Soviet 'Cold War of movement' ... and would
have produced a shattering reaction in the United States ...

52

Indeed, nearly all in the Kennedy administration shared this
view, including the President and the Attorney General:
you hadn't acted,

"If

.. Robert Kennedy told his brother, "you

would have been impeached."

The President said, "That's what

I think--I would have been impeached ... 53

Schlesinger also

emphasizes the importance of diplomacy, particularly the pledge
made by Robert Kennedy to Dobrynin, as being crucial to termin
ating the crisis, after having first created a military
'h
.ItS success. 54
settIng
t at woul d ,
Insure

Thus, Schlesinger

applauds the flexibility of the quarantine, the willingness
to keep communication lines open, and the firm resolve of
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Kennedy:

"It was this combination of toughness and restraint,

of will, nerve and wisdom, so brilliantly controlled, so
matchlessly calibrated, that dazzled the world.,,55
Roger Hilsman was the Djrector of Intelligence and Research
for the State Department under President Kennedy, and his
account of the Cuban missile crisis in To-Move
A Nation combines
--several of the perspectives previously discussed by tradition
alists.

Hilsman stresses the miscalculations of intelligence

experts on both sides, pointing to the belief in the United
States that the high probability that the U.S. would discover
missiles placed in Cuba combined with the instability of
Castro's regime seemingly made the installation of ballistic
missiles in Cuba highly unlikely.56

He also maintains that

the Soviets completely underestimated the range of probable
u.S. responses.

Moreover, Hilsman claims that it was the

suddenness of Khrushchev's action and the subsequent change
in the status quo which demanded a response to the crisis.
His praise of the course of action chosen is virtually uncond
itional:

"The keynote of the United States response was

flexibility and self-disciplined restraint--a graduated effort
which avoided trying to achieve too much and which stopped
short of confronting an adversary with stark and imperative
,
ChOl. ces. " 5 7
In Hllsman
s assessment, l. t wa s t h e com b'lne d
I

threat of United States conventional and nuclear power that
convinced the Soviets to remove the missiles, placing him in
agreement with Bundy and Taylor.

In accordance with the general

traditional interpretation by participants, Hilsman stresses
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not only the management skills Kennedy displayed during the
crisis but also his "inner calmness, a slightly detached,
cool and objective view of himself and those around him that
freed him from compulsiveness," which cUlminated, in Hilman's
.,
,
opInIon,
In
a P reSl'd ent wh 0 was a lea d er an d a hero. 58

Walt W. Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
of the State Department during the Dennedy years, agrees with
the consensus of the traditional interpretation.

For him,

the genius of Kennedy's blockade was that it required Khrushchev
to initiate military action; indeed, he states that it was
even possible that Khrushchev never anticipated a quarantine
as an option for Kennedy--an error attributable to intelligence
,
.
59
mIscalculatIons.

In h"IS praIse of the PreSl'd ent, Rostow

notes that history will forever "record that Kennedy presided
over the virtually bloodless Gettysburg of the Cold War in
b 'In October 1 9 62." 60
the Carl. bean
The traditional participants form a fairly cohesive
perspective, concurring on most points.

Most agree that there

were gross miscalculations by intelligence experts on both
sides.

All agree that the missiles altered the balance of

power In an area of vital concern to the United States, although
t.here is disagreement over whether this was a strategjc or
a political imbalance.
~he

act.

Regardless, such a sudden change in

status quo left President Kennedy no other option than to
The choice of a quarantine receives nearly unanimous

support from the participants, and even air strike advocates
Bundy and Taylor praise the President's final decision to choose
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a flexible response.

Several traditionalists, including Bundy,

Taylor and Hilsman, contend that it was the combined conventional
and nuclear military threat of the United States which resolved
the crisis, while others, like Sorenson, Rusk and Schlesinger,
say that the military created a setting for diplomacy to be
the effective factor in ending the crisis.

For all traditional

participants, however, the Cuban missile crisis was Kennedy's
finest hour, as illustrated by the following tribute to Kennedy,
whose authors include Rusk, McNamara, Sorenson and Bundy:
We may be forgiven, however, if we give the last
and highest word of honor to our own President, whose
cautious determination, steady composure, deep-seated
compassion and, above all, continuously attentive
control of our options and actions brilliantly served
his country and all of mankind. 61
It is this type of effusive, emotional praise which is
the essential difference between the traditionalists writing
from the participants' perspective and those writing from the
observers' perspective.

Although the observers of the crisis

are a diverse group, consisting of journalists who covered
the confrontation and pOlitical scientists who wrote in the
1960s and 1970s, they present essentially the same perspective.
There is also a consensus wi.th the participants' perspective
in at least three major areas.

First, both groups agree that

there were serious miscalculations by intelligence in both the
United States and the Soviet Union.

Second, both agree that

offensive missiles in Cuba would have altered the balance of
power; therefore, President Kennedy was required to take action
to preserve the status quo and United States credibility.

Third,

both participants and observers emphasize that Kennedy acted
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responsibly throughout the crisis, with participants stressing
his calm and cool demeanor and observers accentuating his ability
..

to manage t h e crlS1S.

62

The earliest traditional interpretation by observers of
the crisis was put forth in December of 1962 in a Saturday
Evening Post article by Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett,
both journalistic advocates of a firm U.S. policy toward the
Soviet Union.

As the first traditional interpretation of the

crisis, this article is noteworthy in several respects.

Alsop

and Bartlett were the first to identify advocates of the alr
strike as "hawks" and advocates of the blockade as "doves,"
·
.
63
t h us set t lng
a prece d ent for future wrlters.

In accordance

with other traditionalists, both journalists maintain that
offensive missiles in Cuba would have altered both the strategic
and pOlitical balance of power, though they contend that it
was the political significance of the Soviet action which was
most crucial for the President and his advisers.

"If they'd

got away with this one," said one member of EXCOITUn, "we'd have
been a paper tiger, a second-class power.,,64

Although Alsop

and Bartlett caution against the belief that the crisis proved
that the Soviets would always back down in a nuclear confronta
tion, they do assert that the crisis showed that the Soviets
would make concessions if the United States responded firmly
.
.
.
d 6 5Flnally,
.
wh en ltS
vltal
lnterests
were threatene.
t h e two

journalists also stress the responsible leadership of the Pres
ident, praising the fact that, in the words of an ExCoITUn member,
"he never lost his nerve":

"This must be counted a huge intangible
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plus.

A President's nerve is the essential factor when two

great nuclear powers are 'eyeball to eyeball.

66
III

While Kennedy's actions met with approval initially,
criticisms eventually arose from both the left and the rightwings of the political spectrum.

It was partiallY In response

to these critics that Bartlett teamed with Newsweek correspondent
Edward Weinstal in 1967 in writing the book Facing the Brink.
A main criticism from those on the left was the claim that
Kennedy escalated a confrontation with the Soviets in order to
boost Democratic gains in the November Congressional elections.
In response, Weinstal and Bartlett maintain that "He (Kennedy)
was so deeply aroused by the hazards of the confrontation and
its peace-or-war implications that even at close range he seemed
beyond concern for the elections ....

67
11

Weinstal and Bartlett

also answer charges from those on the right who contended
that Kennedy overstated the danger of nuclear war, and therefore
foreclosed seeking a decisive
of communism in Cuba.

u.s.

victory by the eradication

While the two journalists admit that,

In retrospect, Kennedy did have the leverage to "tighten the
screws" on Khrushchev, they also point out that "the President
did not have the comfortable vantage-point of hindsight.
Neither he nor any of his advisers could foresee how rationally
the Soviet leaders would behave when faced with retreat. 11 68
They also emphasize the concern over possible reprisals in
Berlin and the desire to negotiate peace with Khrushchev after
the crisis:

"He could not mortify the man and hope to deal

,
. h h'lm later." 69
constructlvely
Wlt

Finally, Weinstal and Barrlett
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praise Kennedy's responsible leadership during the crisis,
particularly his ability to place himself in Khrushchev's shoes
in order to determine how the Soviet leader would react to a
,

.

,

glven sltuatlon.

70

One of the most widely-read overviews of the missile crisis
was written in 1966 by Elie Abel, a former foreign correspondent
for the New York Times.

Like other traditionalists, Abel

stresses the miscalculations of intelligence experts in both
countries.

For Americans, the crucial error was the inability

to consider the possibility of the Soviets placing offensive
missiles in Cuba, while the Soviets gravely underestimated
'
Kenne d y's rea d lness
to act. 71

Abel also maintains that Kennedy

was superb in the crisis, behaving both carefully and rationally
,
,
In
"steerlng
a safe course between war an d surren d er." 72

Th e

decision to impose a quarantine was wisest, according to Abel,
because it allowed the President's policy of brinksmanship to
be successful:

"The President's crucial achievement, once the

crisis had started, was to make Khrushchev understand that he
must withdraw--by showing him the nuclear abyss, to the edge
of which he had blundered, and pointing a way back without
disgrace. ,,73
Taken together, the perspectives of traditionalists writing
as both participants and as observers form a cohesive interpre
tation.

There is agreement regarding the failure of intelligence

on both sides.

The Soviets mistakenly thought that the United

States would accept offensive missiles in Cuba as a fait accompli,
therefore underestimating the determined response of Kennedy,

while Americans wrongly assumed that the Soviets would continue
their policy of not placing offensive missiles outside of its
borders.

There is also a consensus in the belief that nuclear

missiles in Cuba would alter the balance of power--either strate
gicallY or politically--thereby affecting

u.s. interests and

necessitating a response in order to maintain the status quo.
Finally, there is agreement among traditionalists that Kennedy
skillfully managed the art of brinksmanship, reacting calmly
and rationally by striking a balance between exerting too much
pressure and not exerting enough, with participants

pla~ing

greater emphasis on the personal qualities of the President
than observers, who stress his management skills.

Chapter III:

The Right-Wing Interpretation

The right-wing interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis
~s

in sharp contrast with that of the traditionalists.

group of writers advocating a conservative perspective

The
com

~s

prised mainly of conservative academicians and exiled Cubans,
writing almost exclusively within the decade following the
1
confrontation.
Although collectively the right wing interpre
ters do not form an interpretation as cohesive as that of the
traditionalists, there is a general agreement on some issues.
Most of those writing from the right-wing perspective maintain
that Kennedy was at least partially to blame for the crisis
because his lack of resolve in foreign policy, as exhibited
in the Berlin Wall crisis and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, convinced
Khrushchev that he could successfully deploy missiles in Cuba.
Moreover, Kennedy was too anxious to deal with Khrushchev,
adopting a policy of conciliation despite the overwhelming
military superiority of the United States.

For the conservatives,

the resolution of the crisis was not Kennedy's finest hour.
Instead, presented with a golden opportunity to wipe out Castro
and communism in Cuba, Kennedy's actions, in Richard Nixon's
words, "enabled the United states to pull defeat out of the
jaws of victory.rr

2

In addition, say the conservative critics,

the Soviets remain in Cuba, and the missiles may remain as well,
hidden in Cuban caves. 3
The right-wing interpretation of the missile

cr~s~s

was

initiated by David Lowenthal, a professor of political science
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at Wheaton College, in an article for National Review in January
1963.

Lowenthal cites Kennedy's weak Cuban policy following

the Bay of Pigs

fiasco

in April 1961 as courting disaster,

because it gave Khrushchev the confidence to send missiles to
Cuba, thus allowing Cuba to become the hemisphere's third strong
est military power.

4

Furthermore, Lowenthal maintains that

the demand for the removal of all offensive missiles in Cuba,
to be enforced by the quarantine, was the bare minimal option
open to the President, and even this pOlicy was pursued weakly.5
Although Lowenthal sharply criticizes President Kennedy, he
does allow that the primary fault lies not with individuals or
pOlitical parties but with the philosophy of international
affairs which dominates the country:

we refuse to use coercion

for moral ends, and retaliation never even enters our minds as
.
.
6
a vlable
alternatlve.

'
Lowenthal's h ars h est commentary lS

directed at Kennedy's no-invasion pledge, which he interprets
as a "guarantee that Communist penetration into this hemisphere
has the right to exist if it shows no sign of military aggres
,
7
Slon."

'
Thus, Lowenthal concludes that Kenned
y "made cOnceSSlons

that will assist the growth of Communist military power and
subversion in this hemisphere .... Nothing closer to an explicit
retraction of the Monroe Doctrine has ever been made by any
President. 11 8
A more moderate right-wing interpretation of the crlSlS
was proposed by James Daniel and John Hubbell in Strike in the
West, the first fUll-length book on the missile crisis, published
in 1963.

Daniel and Hubbell sharply criticize intelligence
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experts and the State Department for brushing aside reports of
the Soviet offensive military build-up in Cuba:

"Before October

16th, Americans could take little pride or comfort--and discover
no logic--in their government's lack of recognition of the
threat from Cuba. ,,9

However, in a deviation from most right-

wing interpreters, Daniel and Hubbell hold that, once the
missiles were discovered, Kennedy reacted admirably.

They

praise Kennedy's policy of exerting pressure on Khrushchev
while at the same time exercising restraint by allowing the
Premier time to withdraw at each stage of the crisis.

"The

United States had boldly asserted its will--and its might--in
the Nuclear Age.

The enemy had refused the challenge."

10

Nonetheless, Daniel and Hubbell end their account by asking
the crucial question for the right-wing interpretation:
this was a victory, where are the fruits?

If

According to reports,

the crisis raised high hopes of liberation in Cuba--only to
have them dashed.

Castro and communism remained firmly entrench

ed in Cuba, and Kennedy's no-invasion pledge left little hope
for the future.

Russian troops, as well as military equipment,

were still situated in Cuba.
.
.
?11
these t h e fruIts
of vIctory.

Daniel and Hubbell repeat, are
Yet, despite these failures,

Daniel and Hubbell do find some positive aspects in the after
math of the crISIS.
secure.

Militarily, the Guantanamo base remained

On the diplomatic front, there was a new respect for

the will of America and Kennedy, as Khrushchev noted after the
crisis to the Chinese, wo claimed that the United States was
only a paper tiger:

"the 'paper tiger' has nuclear teeth.,,12
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Most importantly, the United States had shown that it would
not panic under the Soviet's nuclear threats, thus strengthening
.
'
.
13
our stature In
the eyes of bot h
our ailles
an d t h e Sovlets.

Though slightly further to the right in his orientation,
Malcolm E. Smith presents essentially the same arguments in
Kennedy's Thirteen Great Mistakes in the White House, pUblished
In 1968.

Smith goes further than Daniel and Hubbell in that

he accuses Kennedy of intentionally ignoring the Cuban situation
In order to prevent it from becoming a prominent issue in the
1962 campaign.

14

Nevertheless, Kennedy was forced to confront

the issue when the U-2 photographs were presented to him,
compelling him to take decisive action in order to preserve
U. S. interests.

To this extent Smith praises Kennedy, stating,

"Faced with as terrible a crisis as any ever before thrust upon
a President, Kennedy did not waver in his 'eyeball to eyeball'
confrontation with Khrushchev.

He met the crisis and forced

·
t h e R USSlan
lea d er to back d own." 15

. ,
However, as the crlSlS

reached its conclusion, Kennedy adopted a fatal policy of
accomodation.

According to Smith, the United States made an

unnecessarily high concession in promising not to invade Cuba.

16

Moreover, Smith contends that the informal pledge to take U.S.
missiles out of Turkey was a costly compromise, citing a
Defense Department paper published in October of 1962 which
stated that the Turkish missile bases were vital to the Free
World's defenses.

17

Finally, Smith asserts that there continue

to be reports of intermediate-range nuclear missiles hidden in
Cuban caves, making, in Smith's opinion, Kennedy's retreat from
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his initial demand of on-site inspection of Cuba perhaps his
.
18
greatest mlstake.
After the publication of Robert Kennedy's Thirteen Days
ln 1968, Dean Acheson discussed his differences with the Attorney
General in an article for Esquire entitled "Dean Acheson's
Version of Robert Kennedy's Version of the Cuban Missile
Affair."

Acheson's account is a departure from other right-

wing interpretations in that he does not view the aftermath
of the crisis as a defeat for the United States.

Instead, he

concentrates on his assertion that, while President Kennedy's
"leadership, firmness and judgment" were admirable, Kennedy
was also p henomenally lucky. 19

. h t h e POSSl'b le exceptlon
.
Wlt

of the military, Acheson was the foremost "hawk" at the ExComm
meetings, maintaining that a limited air strike was the only
clear and effective solution, yet it "constantly became obscured
and complicated by the trimmings added by the military.

20
11

Acheson sharply criticizes the blockade decision, claiming that
it created possibly even greater dangers than an air strike,
,
,
b
'
.
.,
21
wlthout
the compensatlng
eneflt
of removlng
t h e mlsslles.

He contends that the military confrontation which the "doves"
wanted to avoid could still occur when Soviet ships reached
the blockade and, more importantly, the blockade gave the
Soviets time to make the missiles operational. 22

While Acheson

acknowledges President Kennedy's ability to manage the confron
tation, he refers to Kennedy's attempt to resolve the crisis
with a series of messages to Khrushchev as "a gamble to the
point of recklessness," for while the leaders debated work on

-32

...
.
d 23
the mlsslle
sltes contlnue
.

Additionally, Acheson finds

fault with the method of deliberation in the ExComm meetings.
While some ExComm members applauded the uninhibited nature of
the discussion, Acheson maintains that this was an improper
way to operate the National Security Council:

"The chief advice

reaching the President during this critical period came to
him through his brother, the Attorney GEneral, out of a leader
less, uninhibited group, many of whom had little knowledge
either in the military or diplomatic field.,,24

In conclusion,

Acheson reiterates that, while not wanting to detract from the
President's laurels, the luck of Khrushchev's befuddlement
and loss of nerve was essential to the successful resolution
..

of t h e crlSlS.

25

As could be expected, Cuban exiles felt most strongly that
the Cuban missile crisis represented a lost opportunity.
Mario Lazo, a Cuban lawyer who was imprisoned by Castro before
coming to the United States, puts forth a far-right-wing inter
pretation in his 1968 book Dagger in the Heart.

Lazo holds

that the liberals in the Kennedy administration essentially
handed over Cuba to the communists with their policy of caution,
restraint, and accomodation.

Lazo blames President Kennedy

for the Soviet introduction of missiles into Cuba, for it was
Kennedy's inexperience and tendency to vacillate which convinced
Khrushchev that his endeavor would be successful. 26

Central

to Lazo's interpretation is his contention that the missile
crisis was a power confrontation.

Lazo maintains that the

United States could have destroyed every vital Soviet military
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installation and population center within a few hours, while
the strike capability of the Soviet Union was negligible; thus,
the power of the United States was incomparably superior to
that of the Soviet Union, and, moreover, the leaders of both
,
nat10ns
knew t h'1S to b e a fact. 27

However, Kennedy followe d

a weak policy of conciliation, according to Lazo:

"Although

Kennedy held the trump cards, he granted the Communist Empire
a privileged sanctuary in the Caribbean by means of the 'no
invasion' pledge.,,28

Lazo also sharply criticizes additional

u.S. concessions, such as Robert Kennedy's pledge to Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin regarding the Turkish missile bases and,
in what Lazo describes as a secret concession, President Kennedy's
orders to crackdown on anti-Castro activities in the United
.,
29
States after t h e cr1S1S.

In addition, Lazo accuses former

Kennedy administration officials of trying to cover up details
of the affair and demands a full disclosure of all communications
,
. d between Wash1ngton
' d
'
,,30
WhlCh
transp1re
an Moscow d
ur1ng
t h e crlS1S.
The American people, Lazo contends, should understand the
extent to which the national security of their country was
compromised, and the Cuban people deserve to know the truth
regarding the betrayal of their country by the Kennedy adminis
.
31
tratlon.

,
..
In concluslon,
Sazo d eclares t h at t h e Cu b an m1SS1le

crisis was not "kennedy's finest hour," but rather "a defeat
and calamity for the United States and Latin America, and
therefore for the Free World."

32

Even further to the right is The Losers, an account of
Soviet and communist penetration in Latin America by Paul D.
Bethel, at one time a political prisoner under Castro and a
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former press attache to the American Embassy in Havana.

In

describing President Kennedy and others in his administration
as liberal isolationists--the losers--Bethel accuses the Pres
ident of deliberately portraying the crisis as a doomsday
confrontation so that he could abandon Cuba in exchange for
' h t h e Sovlets.
'
33
,
'
rapproc h ement Wlt
Pr10r
to t h e confrontatlon,
Kennedy remained aloof from the rising public and Congressional
clamor for action in Cuba, making it clear that he would not
interfere unless the United States was under the threat of an
immediate attack.

Therefore, Kennedy permitted the Soviets

to do whatever they wanted in Cuba, making a shambles of the
,34
Monroe Doctrlne.

"
In Bet h el's 0p1n1on,
t h e Pres1'd ent's

11

d
'
eVlOUS

policy" of a blockade amounted to little more than an invitation
to the Soviets to remove their missiles from Cuba.

35

Bethel

also cri ti ci zes the belief among the New Frontier "losers"
that Khrushchev had to be allowed a means to save face; to
the contrary, Bethel asserts that lIit is practically a religion
among Communists not to punish those of their leaders who
withdraw in the face of superior force .... Pursuance of a
belligerent course under adverse conditions carries with it
'
,
,36
·
t h e unpar d ona b le r1sk
of t h
reatenJng
the commun1st
enterprlse.
1I

Thus, Khrushchev got what he wanted--an ironclad guarantee of
Cuba. 37

,
In h'1S conclusJon,
Bethel even goes so far as to

suggest that Kennedy's decision to back down from the on-site
inspection demand was an indication of a possible conspiracy:

"An inspection team might find that the two nuclear powers had
'
b
'
' " 38
'
cooperate d 1n
an un b
elleva
ly cynlcal
deceptlon.
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While there is a greater range of extremes in the right
wing interpretatjon than in that of the traditionalists, most
writers of this perspective agree on several basic issues.
Nearly all agree that Kennedy was at least partially to blame
for the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba, as his lack
of leadership prior to the crisis convinced Khrushchev that
he could be successful in this endeavor.

Moreover, Kennedy's

pOlicy of accomodation, despite the overwhelming nuclear
superiority of the United States, led to the loss of a rare
opportunity to rid Cuba of Castro and communism, via the no
invasion pledge.
The more moderate right-wing interpreters--Daniel and
Hubbell, Smith and, to a certain degree, Acheson--criticize
Kennedy's refusal to acknowledge the growing Soviet threat in
Cuba prior to the confrontation.

However, there is general

agreement that President Kennedy reacted admirably once the
crisis began, although Acheson attributes the resolution of
the crisis to luck as much as to Kennedy's abilities.

In the

aftermath of the crisis, however, moderate rjght-wing interpre
ters criticize the unnecessarily high concession made by
Kennedy.

With the exception of Acheson, who describes the

resolution of the crisis as a success for the United States,
other moderate conservatives claim that the no-invasion pledge
and the informal promise to remove the Turkish missile bases
led to an overall defeat for the United States, although
Daniel and Hubbell found some comfort in the increased stature
of the United States in world oplnlon.
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For those further to the right, including Lowenthal and,
to the far-right, Lazo and Bethel, the crisis was a victory
for the Sovi.ets and a humiliating defeat for the United States.
President Kennedy was directly to blame for the placement of
missiles in Cuba due to deliberate efforts to ignore Soviet
penetration of the iSland.

Most importantly, Kennedy's weak

policy of accomodation, including the quarantine decision and
the no-invasion pledge, resulted in an explicit retraction of
the Monroe Doctrine and guaranteed the right of Castro and
communism to exist in Cuba.

Chapter IV:

The Left Wing Interpretation

The left-wing interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis
is a perspective which is at odds with both the traditional
and the right-wing interpretations.

The group advocating this

perspective is composed of journalists, free-lance writers,
historians and pOlitical scientists who wrote primarily during
the 1970s.

The main point of this interpretation is the asser

tion that President Kennedy intentionally raised the Cuban
affair to the level of crisis and confrontation, thereby
irresponsibly and recklessly subjecting the world to the threat
of nuclear war.

The liberal interpreters form a much more

cohesive perspective than that of the right-wing, agreeing on
most issues.

The left-wingers accuse Kennedy of rejecting

diplomacy, by-passing private negotiations with the soviets
for a pUblic confrontation.

They maintain that the missiles

In Cuba were a problem of prestige, a political problem, yet
Kennedy responded with a military act in the form of a blockade.
Moreover, many left-wing interpreters accuse Kennedy of takjng a
belligerent course of action in order to prove his toughness
to the world, thus placing his personal and political needs
over the security and safety of the nation.

Finally, the after

math of the crisis brought not victory but arrogance, and gave
the United States the confidence to continue seeking military
solutions to other international problems.

1

Roger Hagan, a pacifist and editor of The Correspondent,
wrote the first left-wing interpretation with the article
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"Cuba:
Dissent.

Triumph or Tragedy?", appearing in the 1963 issue of
Hagan contends that President Kennedy rejected diplo

macy in favor of a policy of "righteous realpolitik" that only
confirmed Khrushchev's conviction in the necessity of sending
Soviet weapons to trouble areas like Cuba,

and

Kennedy's

demonstration of force did little to offset this belief.

The

crisis, therefore, was a tragedy in that it served no long
range goals.

2

According to Hagan, Kennedy faced a choice be

tween two different types of risk:

"He could take a course

that would risk war, or a course that would risk his political
.
future and that of hlS
party." 3

Hagan respon d s to the a d"
mlnlS

tration's argument that the missiles altered the strategic
balance of power, claiming that the missiles neither affected
the U.S. first-strike capacity or its retaliatory second-strike
capability.4

Moreover, Hagan holds that the administration's

contention that the missiles in Cuba were offensive while ours
in Turkey were defensive never surpassed the level of reasoning
"because we know our intentions are not aggressive."S

Yet,

Hagan maintains, by stating that the missiles in Cuba were
offensive, Kennedy could accuse the Soviets of deception, thereby
creating a base of support for military action. 6

However,

Hagan adds that "the point is not that the National Security
Council consciously contrived a false rationale while pursuing
hidden purposes.,,7

Instead, Hagan's point is that, while removal

of the missiles was desirable in the interest of slowing the
arms race, the proper course of action was negotiation rather
than military action, though he does credit Kennedy for his
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decision to pursue a more moderate military course in the form
of a blockade.

However, in the final analysis, "politics,

toughness, a sense of nakedness and military peril, a sense
of being tested, silly rage, all were probably mingled into an
unanalyzed conviction of the necessity of our action.,,8
The first far-left-wing interpretation of the missile
crisis was offered by Leslie Dewart, a Professor of Philosophy
at the University of Toronto, in a 1965 article published in
Studies on the Left.

In a more radical perspective, Dewart

holds that President Kennedy purposefully deceived the Soviets
into thinking that he would accept the deployment of missiles
in Cuba, when in reality he did not intend to do so.

"The U.S.

plan was to feign surprise at the later 'discovery' of the
missiles and, then, with the backing of an aroused,

'managed'

public opinion, to demand the unconditional withdrawal of the
missiles. 119

Moreover, Dewart sharply criticizes the blockade,

saying its weaknesses were twofold:

diplomatically, it suffered

from glaring illegality, and, militarily, it was ineffective,
as it allowed the Soviets to sit and wait, for the weapons
'
were alrea d y In
Cu b a. 10

According to Dewart, though Khrushchev

was foolish to place the missiles in Cuba, it was fortunate
for the world that he rationally elected to end the crisis,
'h
' defeat. 11
d esplte
t e catastrop h'l C d'l plomatlc

However, Kennedy's

victory was less than conclusive, for he was forced to accept
that an overthrow of Castro's Cuba was no longer an expedient
,

pollcy.

12

The first "new left" criticism of President Kennedy's
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handling of the missile crisis to appear in a book was Ramparts
editor David Horowitz's The Free World Colossus in 1965.

While

Horowitz does not concur with the conspiracy theory of Dewart,
he does charge that the Kennedy administration, having establish
ed its missile superiority to the Soviet Union, was waiting
"for an opportune moment to demonstrate its nuclear superiority
to the world, and with the prestige thus gained, tip the scales
of the world power balance.

The test was expected to come in

Berlin, when Cuba presented itself.,,13

Kennedy justified his

extreme action with the false premise that the Cuban missiles
altered the strategic balance of power.

Horowitz backs his

accusation with a statement made after the crisis by Deputy
Defense Secretary Gilpatric:

"I don't believe that we were

under any greater threat from the Soviet Union's power, taken
..

.

,

In ltS totallty, after thls than before."

14

.

Thus, Horowltz

concludes that the missiles actually represented a threat to
the political balance of power only, yet Kennedy responded
with an act of war in the form of a naval blockade.

For

Horowitz, this raises the question of why the administration
did not follow norman diplomatic procedures upon discovery of
the missjles:

"Why was not the Soviet Ambassador given an

ultimatum in private, before the presence of the missiles was
disclosed to the world and the prestige of the United States
had been put on the line?1I 15

Instead, Horowitz contends,

Kennedy chose to engage in a test of will with the Soviet Union,
endangering "not only the lives and destinies of the Soviet and
American peoples, but hundreds of millions of people in other
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' h
.
,.
16
countrles
who ad no role ... In
t h e crlsls."

I.F. Stone, a journalistic critic of U.S. foreign policy,
put forth a strong indictment against President Kennedy in "The
Brink," a 1966 article in The New York Review of Books.

The

missile crisis, Stone claims, was a game of political prestige
between Kennedy and Khrushchev to see who would back down first.
It was the courage of John F. Kennedy which was in question,
the credibility of his willingness to go all the way if the
.
,
d 17
mlsslles
were not remove.

Moreover, Stone charges K enne d y

with placing his political interests above the safety of the
nation.

The Congressional elections were only three weeks away,

and if the missiles were still in Cuba it would certainly have
been disastrous for the Democrats; thus, there was no time for
prolonged negotiation--Kennedy had to act if he wanted to pre
'
.
serve h lS
party's control ln
Congress. 18

In reference to

Sorenson's sentimental portrait of a worried and distraught
President, Stone replies, "If Kennedy were so concerned he might
have sacrificed his chances in the election to try and nego
tiate. 1I19

Stone also places responsibility for the crisis on

Khrushchev for foolishly thinking that he could install missiles
in Cuba and deceive the United States; nonetheless, we are
indebted to Khrushchev for his decision to favor defussion of
.,
,20
t h e crlS1S
over h'lS prestlge.

In the en d , Stone conten d s

that negotiation, however prolonged, would have been preferable
to the risk of World War III, and, according to him, most
Americans would have felt the same way:

"Given the choice

between the danger of a Republican majority in the House and
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the danger of thermonuclear war, voters might conceivably have
'h
"
.
'b Ie." 21
thought the former somewh at less frlg
tenlng
and lrreverSl

In Cold War and Counterrevolution, written in 1972, histor
ian Richard J. Walton continues the "new left" perspective.
Walton charges that Kennedy consciously risked nuclear war, a
decision which was "irresponsible and reckless to a supreme
degree .... ,,22

While those on the right claim that it was

President Kennedy's weak Cuban policy which brought on the
crisis, Walton contends that it was Kennedy's unrelenting hos
tility toward Cuba which compelled the Soviets to install the
,.
23
mlsslles.

.
However, although Khrushc h ev h a d as much rlght

under international law to place missiles in Cuba as we did In
Turkey, he was still guilty of being reckless; common sense
should have told him that Kennedy would not stand for nuclear
warheads in Cuba. 24
far more reckless.

Still, according to Walton, Kennedy was
While granting that pOlitical realities

required that Kennedy get rid of the missiles, Walton maintains
that he could have done so through diplomatic channels.

25

Instead, Kennedy's macho character and fervent anti-communism
prompted him to demand an unconditional and pUblic surrender
from a proud and powerfUl adversary.26

In the final analysis,

Walton maintains that, while many believed that Kennedy had
won the "eyeball to eyeball" confrontation, Khrushchev in fact
achieved the objectives he set forth in his decision to place
the missiles in Cuba; namely, a guarantee of Cuban security
. . ,In Turkey an d I taly." 27
and removal of U.S. mlSSlles
The left-wing perspective in continued in The Kennedy
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Doctrine, written in 1972 by Louise FitzSimons, a former foreign
affairs officer for the Atomic Energy Commission.

FitzSimons

hOlds that the "Kennedy Doctrine" was based on the President's
belief, as a ColdWar warrior, that the United States should act
deci si ve ly in world event s.

This, coupled with Kennedy's

concern with prestige and credibility, led him to elevate the
Cuban situation to a confrontation in public rather than in
private, thereby dangerously engaging the prestige of both
sides.

28

FitzSimons, after stating that Kennedy believed the

missiles in Cuba represented more of a political than a strategic
alteration in the balance of power, asks why the President was
compelled to demand unconditional surrender from Khrushchev.
To answer this question FitzSimons cites several factors:
Kennedy's history of preoccupation with Cuba as an issue; fear
that his prestige would suffer and Khrushchev would view him
as weak;

letting Cold War thinking dominate his reasoning and

prevent any flexibility in dealing with the Soviets; and fears
that public outrage could result in the removal of his party,
'
,
29
or even h lmself, from offlce.

FitzSimons reaches the conclus

ion that the Cuban missile crisis was not necessary.

Militarily,

there was not a sUfficient threat to the United States to
justify the risk of nuclear war.

In pOlitical terms, the

unwillingness to allow any movement from the dominant American
political position in the world appears unreasonable.

Finally,

negotiation could have led to the neutralization of Cuba,
resulting in greater long-term benefits for the United States:
"A neutralized Cuba would have meant the removal of a pOlitical
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albatross from around the neck of the Kennedy administration
and would have freed American policy for a more positive approach
,
,
.
,
30
to relat10ns w1th Lat1n AmerIca."

The leftist tradition progressed throughout the 1970s,
and it included political scientist Bruce Miroff's Pragmatic
Illusions,

published in 1976.

Miroff's central theme is that

President Kennedy constantly transformed local affairs into
international Cold War crises, each of which became a test of
'd
.
d'1ng the Cuban m1ss1le
."
.
31
U. S. w1ll
an resolve--Inclu
cn.S1S.

While Miroff contends that the Soviets were justified in placing
missiles in Cuba, he concedes that it was a reckless decision
on Khrushchev's part, both because it was carried out clandes
tinely and, more importantly, because it touched on Kennedy's
, ,
,
.
'
most senSItIve
spot. 3 2Mlroff
cla1ms
t h at d esp1te
t h e fact

that Kennedy viewed the Soviet move as essentially a political
one, a test of United STates determination and resolve, he
never considered diplomatic action, choosing to contront rather
,33
t h an to negotIate.

Miroff suggests that Kennedy may have

wanted the showdown, and Khrushchev'S Cuban gamble provided
the perfect opportunity for the confrontation he had long been
,
34
seek1ng.

'
'
d a test
In b
acklng
up h"1S claIm that Kenne d y d eSlre

of will with Khrushchev, Miroff points to psychological reasons;
Kennedy's concern with appearing tough, which "amounted to
almost an

0

.
35.
. ,
b seSS1on."
Also, M1roff contends that polItIcal

reasons were a motivating factor as well.

Kennedy longed for

a Cold War victory, and a confrontation in the Caribbean over
Cuba, where America had an overwhelming military advantage,
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provided an excellent opportunity to decisively stop the tide
of Soviet advancement.

36

Miroff concludes that, after Khrush

chev's initial recklessness, he acted with prudence and, if
he had not, Kennedy's triumph would have been a catastrophe.
In summarizing his interpretation of the crisis, Miroff states:
Eschewing a diplomatic approach, insisting upon
the use of force to compel a Russian retreat, Kennedy
had brought the world to the brink of nuclear war for
the sake of AMerican prestige and influence .... This
was hardly the stuff of pOlitical greatnessi in the
final analysis, Kennedy's conduct in the missile crisis
was neither responsible nor justifiable. 37
One of the most recent liberal interpretations of the
missile crisis comes from Thomas G. Paterson in the 1989 book
Kennedy's Quest for Victory.

Paterson claims that President

Kennedy had a fixation with Cuba, embarking upon "an unrelenting
campalgn to monitor, harass, isolate and ultimately destroy
'

,38

Gavana's ra d lcal reglme.

II

In explaining why Kennedy opted

for a public military showdown over formal, private negotiations
and traditional, diplomatic channels, Paterson dismisses several
reasons put forth by other liberals.

Paterson maintains that

Kennedy was not concerned that the missiles would become oper
ationa 1 if diplomacy was used, for he knew by the time of his
television address that many of the missiles were ready to
fire.

39

Moreover, politics was not the answer, for the most

popular pOlitical position would have been an air strike or
.
.
40
an lnvaSlon.

P aterson reasons that KEnne d y reJecte
'
d d'lplo

matic talks as an option because of his strong Cold War views,
his personal hostility toward Castro's Cuba, his desire to
appear bold and tough, and the feeling of being betrayed by
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Khrushchev.

In the end, though nuclear war was averted,

Paterson holds that it was a near mlss.

Thus, citing a remark

by Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith that "success in a lottery
lS no argument for lotteries," Paterson argues that Kennedy's
"near miss" handling of the Cuban missile crisis should not
.

.

be hel d as a mo d el for crlSlS management.

41

Although the criticisms of the left-wing interpreters of
the Cuban missile crisis range from restrained to highly crit
ical, they do form a cohesive interpretation.

Nearly all

left-wing critics maintain that Kennedy's harsh Cuban policy
contributed to the crisis by convincing Khrushchev it was
necessary to place missiles in Cuba.

~

Horowitz asserts that

Kennedy desired a showdown with Khrushchev, while Dewart accuses
Kennedy of conspiring to deliberately induce the Soviets to
deploy missiles in Cuba in order to create a crisis.

The

missiles, most liberals contend, did not alter the strategic
balance of power in the world but only the political balance;
thus, diplomatic negotiations would have been the proper response
to the situation.

However, Kennedy rejected diplomacy, opting

instead for a public military confrontation.

Left-wing inter

preters offer a wide range of reasons for Kennedy's action,
including the President's personal need to demonstrate his
toughness to the world, the desire for a Cold War victory, and
Kennedy's determination to preserve Democratic control in
Congress--none of which were worth the risk of a thermonuclear
holocaust.

Finally, the aftermath of the crisis was not victory

but arrogance according to the liberals, with Dewart, Walton

-47

and FitzSimons claiming that, in the end, the crisis was not
a conclusive victory for the United States because no long
range goals were served by Kennedy's actions.

Chapter V:

Another Perpsective

The continuing scholarly debate over the Cuban missile
crisis is captured by the three interpretations by traditional
ists, the right-wing, and the left wing.

The traditional

interpretation is a cohesive one, with writers agreeing on
most issues.

There is a consensus among traditionalists that

intelligence experts in both the United States and the Soviet
Union made serious miscalculations, thus resulting in the crisis.
Also, traditionalists agree that President Kennedy was forced
to respond out of necessity to the situation, and the blockade
was the perfect flexible response.

Finally, the traditionalists

praise President Kennedy as a calm, responsible leader.
The two revisionist interpretations, from the right-wing
and the left-wing, provide a quite different perspective.

For

conservatives, Kennedy's weak pre-crisis policy toward Cuba
convinced Khrushchev that he could successfully deploy missiles
on the iSland.

Once the crisis began, the right-wing accuses

Kennedy of following a policy of accomodation, resulting in a
defeat for the United States.

Provided with a golden opportunity

to rid Cuba of Castro and communism, Kennedy instead made a
no-invasion pledge to end the crisis, thus guaranteeing that
communism would remain in the Western Hemisphere.

Writing from

the left-wing perspective, most liberals agree that Kennedy was
partially responsible for the initiation of the crisis; however,

t

J

while conservatives blame his weak Cuban pOlicy for this,
liberals maintain that it was Kennedy's harsh, unreasonable
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4

stand toward Cuba which forced Khrushchev to install the missiles.
The liberals view Kennedy as a man who felt the need to prove
his strength to the world; thus, he took what was essentially
a political problem, an issue of prestige, and elevated it
to a crisis level by imposing a military solution, in the form
of a blockade.

The aftermath of the crisis was arrogance, with

Kennedy having forced Khrushchev to backdown to him before
the world.

An accurate interpretation of the Cuban missile crlSlS
must draw from a wide range of perspectives, and certainly
the most plausible interpretation would be a combination of
both the traditional and the left-wing perspective.

Kennedy's

pre-crisis pOlicies were neither harsh nor weaki in a heated
domestic political climate, with many pOlitical opponents
demanding action against Soviet encroachments in Cuba, Kennedy
had embarked upon a pOlicy of reason and responsibility, refusing
to act without conclusive evidence.
Once this evidence was obtainged, the situation was radically
altered.

Kennedy, after months of maintaining that there was

no evidence of an offensive military build up in Cuba and stating
that he would respond forcefully to such action, had no choice-
he ad to react to the situation.

The country simply would

not have tolerated Soviet nuclear warheads ninety milles from
Key WEst.

Had Kennedy not acted, all popular support, not

to mention pOlitical support, would have eroded from beneath
him.

The public trust and faith would have been shattered,

and Kennedy would have been fatally crippled as President.
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Having determined that a response to the Soviet threat was
necessary, the debate turned to finding an appropriate option.
While some traditionalists hold that the option of using
diplomacy as an initial response received significant consideration,
the man who made the final decision, President Kennedy, never
seriously considered this option.

Several crisis writers,

including Sorenson and Schlesinger, admit that Kennedy showed
little interest in diplomatic negotiations.
meeting, Kennedy declared,
,.

out t h ese ... mlsslles."

1

At the first ExComm

"We re certai nly go:i ng ... to take
I

When McNamara mentioned that diplomacy

might precede military action, the President immediately switched
the discussion to another question:

How long would it take to

.strlke
,
'd?2
get an alr
organlze
.

~.

The major argument against diplomatic action as an initial
response was the belief among most ExComm members that more
forceful action was demanded by the Soviet action.

However,

it was not as if an initial diplomatic response to the Soviets
would have eliminated a military option later; indeed, it was
possible that a military option could have been avoided entirely
if diplomacy had been tried first, and, if Kennedy had been
forced to respond militarilY, he could have been fully assured
that he had made every possible effort to peacefully resolve
the crisis.
The other major argument against diplomacy as a response
was that it would have allowed the initiative to pass to the
Soviets.

Kennedy felt that it was vital to surprise the Soviets

with the news of the discovery of the missiles in order to
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allow the United States to control the events of the crisis.
However, it would seem that the naval blockade, to a certain
degree, also allowed the initiative to pass to the Soviets.
Once the blockade was implemented, the Soviets were in control
of the situation; the missiles were already in Cuba, so they
could afford to sit and wait.

The United States was eventually

forced to resort to other means, namely diplomatic channels,
In order to resolve the crisis.
There were three other arguments against a diplomatic
appeal.

First, there was the concern that the missiles would

become operational while diplomatic debate raged on.

However,

the blockade did not solve this problem either, for it
could only stop further shipments of armaments, doing nothing
to halt the continuing work on the missile sites in Cuba.
Moreover, it was wntirely possible that some of the missile
sites were already operational by the time that the blockade
was implemented.

Secondly, some argued that the fact that the

blockade would at least stop further arms shipments made it
a superior option to diplomatic action; however, there were
already enough missiles in Cuba to inflict unnacceptable levels
of destruction upon the United States.

A final argument against

diplomatic action was the contention that a letter demanding
the withdrawal of the missiles would constitute the type of
ultimatum that no great power could accept.

Yet, was the naval

blockade not an ultimatum--a public ultimatum, no less, a
challenge to Khrushchev before the world?

It would seem that

a private diplomatic appeal would have benn less offensive than
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a public military challenge.
President Kennedy also rejected the suggestion, put forth
by Stevenson and journalist Walter Lippmann, among others, that
the Unjted States trade its Jupiter missiles in Turkey for
removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba.

However, later in the

crisis Kennedy was willing to negotiate with the Soviets on
just this issue.

In a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobynin,

Attorney General Robert Kennedy conveyed a message from the
President regarding the missile question.

Although Kennedy

majntainged that there could be no public quid pro quo about
the missiles, he stated, "The President had been anxious to
remove those missiles from Turkey and Italy for a long period
of time.

4

,,~as

He had ordered their removal some time

0.;·0

and i ':.

our judgment that, wi thin a short time after this cr lsis

was over 1 those missi les would be gone. ,.3

Most advocat.es of

the quarantine maintain that this type of negotiation could
only have been successful after the implementation of a blockadG.
However, while it is true that the threat of retaljation posed
by the intense build up of American air strike and invasl0n
forces (over 200,000 troops were assembled in Florida,

~long

with many squadrons of fi.ghters) certainly must have affected
the frame of mind of the Soviets

regarding the situation, the

b:ockade really had nothing to do with the display of American

mil~tary strength. 4

Why would it not have been possjble to

make a diplomatic appeal from the outset, with the military
back-drop already in place?
The most rational thinking in the crisis was put forth by
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4

Chjp Bohlen.

He maintained that the missiles had to be removed

from Cuba; however, while military means had to be considered,
so that they would be readily available if needed, a diplomatic
appeal shoud be tried first. 5

In essence, President Kennedy

reversed the proper order of responses, backtracking to a
diplomatjc appeal because the blockade had failed to illicit
a favorable solution and an air strike still seemed to be too
rjsky of an option.

To Kennedy's credit, he did initially choose

the most moderate military response with the blockade option,
and, once the crisis began, Kennedy behaved in a highly controlled
and rational manner, much in the way he had before the crisis.
He remainged in command of all proceedings throughout the crosos.
and wjsely refrained from overreacting to potentially volatile

4

events, most notably in his decision not to retaljate after the
shooting down of Air Force Major Rudolph Anderson.
Why, then, did Kennedy initially decide on a military
response, only to later resolve the crjsis through secret dip
lomacy of a nature which had been earlier suggested?

While

it is impossible to know what Kennedy's reasons were, his
initial reaction to the news of the Soviet action in Cuba
offers a clue:

"He can't fo thjs to me!,,6

Kennedy interpreted

Khrushchev'S action as both a personal deception and a personal
challenge.

This combined sense of anger at being lied to and

need to prove himself compelled Kennedy to move forcefully
against

Khrushchev~

Kennedy was unable to consider anything

less than a military response.

However, while this reaction

is certainly understandable, Kennedy should have tempered his
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emotions long enough to have at least given proper consideration
to diplomatic options.

Fortunately, this momentary lapse of

judgment subsided, and Kennedy's responsible leadership through
out the remainder of the crisis, coupled with Khrushchev's
rational decision (following his earlier irrational one) to
remove the missiles, combined with a dash of the Irish luck
to thankfully keep the world from ever knowing the answer to
the most grave question of the Cuban missile crisis:

What

would have happened to us all if the Soviets had refused to
back down?

t

e
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